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creditors, goes to the sovereignty to be applied to a purpose similar to
that intended by the grantor.' 3 This solution is the best, for it is con-
sistent with the rule of construction that the instrument is to be con-
strued most strongly against the grantor; it obviates the necessity of
deciding that the transaction is either a gift or purchase; it comes
nearest to carrying out the intention of the grantor; it eliminates a wind-
fall either for the heirs of the donor or members of the defunct corpora-
tion, and at the same time secures support for a worthy cause without
doing harm to any equities.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Taxation-Classification-Discrimination between
Corporations and Natural Persons.
A' Louisiana statute imposed upon every individual, firm, or corpora-
tion engaged in a dyeing, cleaning, pressing, or laundering business a
license tax measured by the gross receipts of the business.' The Lou-
isiana Constitution,2 as construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
exempted from license taxes persons engaged in mechanical pursuits
who perform their work with their own hands.3 A number of corpora-
tions, engaged in the laundry, dry cleaning, and dyeing business, sued
to enjoin the enforcement of the tax, asserting that it denied to them
equal protection of the laws. A three-judge Federal District Court
denied the injunction and held: that the statute is not invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment; that the tax is not one upon receipts or upon
property, but that it is a license tax for the privilege of doing business-
measured by gross receipts; that although corporations are excluded
from the exempt class for the reason that they, imaginary beings, can-
not perform manual labor, the discrimination between corporations and
individuals is not unreasonable. 4
' Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1,
10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. ed. 478 (1889).
ILA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §8612, provides: "That for every individual,
firm, association or corporation carrying on the profession or business of steam
dyeing, steam cleaning, steam pressing, or the business of steam or electric laun-
dering, the license (tax) shall be based upon the gross annual receipts from such
profession or business, .. "
'Art. 10, sec. 8, reads as follows: "License taxes may be levied on such classes
of persons, associations of persons and corporations pursuing any trade, business,
occupation, vocation or profession, as the Legislature may deem proper, except
clerks, laborers, ministers of religion, school teachers, graduated trained nurses,
those engaged in mechanical, agricultural, or horticultural pursuits or in operating
saw mills. . .
'State v. Up-To-Date Shoe Repairing Co., 175 La. 917, 144 So. 714 (1932)
(this case also directly decides that the constitutional exemption does not apply
to corporations engaged in mechanical pursuits).
'White Cleaners & Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F. Supp. 1017 (D. C. La. 1934). The
Court decides that the tax is "for the privilege of doing business as distinguished
NOTES AND COMMENTS
This decision raises again the question, when, for purposes of tax
classification, may States discriminate between natural persons and
corporations ?
The right to classify subjects of taxation is a part of the taxing
power of the State. 5 The only restriction upon the exercise of this
right is that the classification must not be arbitrary, but must be reason-
able under the circumstances and based upon some real difference in the
situation and character of the subjects taxed.6
Tax discrimination between corporations and individuals may be
attributed to a number of causes, chief of which have been the fear of
corporate power; the desire to exact from corporations a consideration
for the advantages of doing business in corporate form; the effort to
aid individual enterprises by placing tax burdens upon their corporate
competitors; a widespread feeling that corporations are better able to
pay; and the fact that the difficulty of concealing corporate property has
made the collection of taxes from corporations easier than from individ-
uals.7
The Supreme Court early decided that the States may impose upon
from either property tax or a tax upon the business or its receipts." In distin-
guishing a tax upon a business from a tax upon the privilege of doing business
the Court relies upon Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55
L. ed. 389 (1911) ; and it is also said that there is a difference between the "gross
receipts" tax, which was held invalid in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928), and the privilege tax imposed
by the Louisiana statute.
The Court's application of these two cases seems subject to criticism. Although
it was said in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. that the tax was for "a carrying on or
doing of business in the designated capacity" (corporate form of business or-
ganization), 220 U. S. 107, 150, the actual decision of that case does not cover the
present tax. There the tax was for the privilege of doing business in corporate
form. It was a franchise tax applicable only to corporations. Whereas the present
tax is a general license imposed upon everyone who exercises the privilege of
doing a cleaning and dyeing business, and it is equally applicable to individuals,
partnerships and corporations. It would seem that the Louisiana tax and the tax
involved in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. are of different natures and are imposed upon
different classes of subjects. The Court avoids the Quaker City Cab decision by
distinguishing a tax upon the privilege of doing business from a tax upon the
business. This distinction may be questioned upon the ground that the two taxes
result in the same ultimate burden upon a business.
' Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1890) ; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 30 Sup. Ct. 578, 54
L. ed. 883 (1910) ; see Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 140-143, 45 Sup. Ct. 424,
426, 69 L. ed. 884 (1925).
'Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct 533, 33 L. ed.
892 (1889) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305,
41 L. ed. 683 (1897) ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct.
560, 64 L. ed. 989 (1920).
See, dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 410, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 558, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928), and
in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 490, 77 L. ed.
929 (1933) ; Neihoff, CoRoATIONS AND THE TAX LAws (1931) 17 ST. Louis L.
REv. 27.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
corporations franchise and excise taxes which are not required of indi-
viduals. In 1868 two decisions sustained franchise taxes upon savings
institutions measured by the amount of their deposits., A third case in
the same year upheld a tax upon the income of insurance companies as
an excise upon their business.9 In 1873 a tax equivalent to a percentage
of the capital stock of railroad and canal companies was held valid as
a franchise tax upon corporations as legal entities ;LO and in 1890 it was
decided that a franchise tax upon all corporations measured by capital
stock did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.". A tax imposed by Congress upon the gross annual re-
ceipts, in excess of $250,000, of corporations carrying on the business
of refining sugar was sustained as an excise tax.12
It is also well established that corporations may not be classified
separately from individuals on the sole basis of the ownership of prop-
erty.13 For this reason property taxes permitting the deduction of
mortgages on land owned by individuals, when a like deduction in the
case of land owned by corporations was not allowed, have been found to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 However, it has been held that
corporations may be treated differently from individuals for the pur-
pose of collecting back taxes.15
In the case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., which was before the Court
in 1911,16 a federal tax of one per cent of the net income of corporations
'Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U. S. 594, 18 L. ed. 897 (1868) ; Provident
Institution v. Massachusetts, 73 U. S. 611, 18 L. ed. 907 (1868).
1 Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U. S. 433, 19 L. ed. 95 (1868).
'0 Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. Co., 85 U. S. 206, 21
L. ed. 888 (1873).
'Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1890).
Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 376, 48
L. ed. 496 (1904).
'County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal.
1882) ; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 385 (C. C. Cal,
1883). See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 402, 48 Sup. Ct,
553, 555, 72 L. ed. 929 (1928) ; Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co. v. Thoresen, 53 N. D.
28, 204 N. W. 861, 865 (1925). In Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed.
686 (C. C. N. D. 1891), Mr. Justice Caldwell said, "Property of the same kind, in
the same condition and used for the same purpose, must be taxed by a uniform
rule without regard to its ownership."
"County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal.
1882) ; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 385 (C. C. Cal.
1883).
"Florida Cent. & Peninsular R. R. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 22 Sup. Ct. 176,
46 L. ed. 283 (1902) (back taxes from railroads); Fort Smith Lumber Co. v.
Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304, 64 L. ed. 396 (1920) (back taxes owed
by corporations upon stock held in other corlorations) ; White River Lumber Co.
v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692, 49 Sup. Ct. 457, 73 L. ed. 903 (1929) ('back taxes on
land owned by corporations).
1- 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1911).
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was upheld as a tax upon the privilege of doing business in a corporate
capacity. The rule was there laid down that corporations may be taxed
differently from individuals, inasmuch as there is a substantial differ-
ence between a business conducted by corporations and the same busi-
ness when done by private individuals.IT But Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania's decided that a state tax upon the gross receipts of
transportation corporations, not imposed upon partnerships and natural
persons engaged in transportation business, violated the equal protec-
tion clause, because the tax was not peculiarly applicable to corporations.
This decision seems to restrict the broad rule laid down in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. governing tax discrimination between corporations and in-
dividuals. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented from the Quaker City Cab
decision'0 on the ground that the imposition of heavier taxes on corpora-
tions than upon individuals had been approved in the Flint case, and
that a tax on gross earnings was a proper means of imposing the heavier
burden. The chain store tax cases, which have upheld tax classification
on the basis of the economic advantages incident to different types of
business organization, 20 may mark a change in the Court's attitude
away from the strict test applied in the Quaker City Cab case and back
to the general rule as stated in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
The instant case presents a license or occupation tax, measured by
gross receipts and imposed on corporations while individuals are exempt.
In view of the Quaker City Cab test the present decision appears to be
wrong, for the license tax would have been equally applicable to individ-
uals and partnerships engaged in the cleaning and pressing business.
However, the conclusion of the Court in upholding the tax is supported
by authority which was unquestioned before the decision of Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania and by subsequent cases which appear to
have shaken the standing of the Quaker City Cab holding.
The present decision seems to approve the imposition of a new
tax upon corporations. In addition to franchise taxes already placed
on the privilege of existing as a corporation, another tax is now ap-
plicable to the privilege afforded the corporate personality of doing a
particular type of business in competition with natural persons. It
would seem that the result of this decision is that corporations may be
subjected to both general franchise taxes and special license taxes upon
the privilege of engaging in grocery, manufacturing, banking, or any
- 220 U. S. 107, 161.
'277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. ed. 927 (1928).
277 U. S. 389, 403.
' State Board of Tax Com'rs of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540, 75 L. ed. 1948 (1931) ; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup.
Ct. 481, 77 L. ed. 929 (1933).
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other business in a corporate capacity, without the imposition of these
taxes on individuals. 21
JoN R. JENKINS, JR.
Vendor and Purchaser-Construction of Instruments-Meaning
of Words "More or Less".
After pointing out its boundaries and corners to the plaintiff,
defendant contracted to exchange his farm, said to contain about 246
acres and valued at $18,000, for the plaintiff's farm plus $8,000. The
contract described defendant's farm as containing "247 acres more or
less." Several years later an anticipated sale of this farm was defeated
by the discovery of a forty acre shortage. In an action to recover for
this shortage, held judgment for defendant on the ground that this was
a sale by tract and the risk of deficiency was on the purchaser.'
The words "more or less" have been accorded varying significance
by the courts. The older rule, which purported to treat the words as if
they had a fixed and definite meaning in all deeds and land contracts,
announced that these words of themselves negatived a sale by acre, all
risk of variation being thereby placed upon the vendor in case of a
surplus, or upon the purchaser in case of a deficiency.2
Realizing that the problem in such cases is one of construction, and
that the intention of the parties should be objectively ascertained in
order to give actual meaning to these words, most courts take into con-
sideration the surrounding facts and circumstances of each case. Even
so, their treatment tends to become categorical. First, if the sale is
intended to be by acre, the words "more or less" will permit only slight
errors of survey or estimation, 3 and will not excuse substantial dis-
'A tendency to impose this additional tax upon corporations may be further
marked by a New York tax statute which provided that every transportation cor-
poration, in addition to a franchise tax, "shall pay for the privilege of exercising
its corporate franchises or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized
capacity in this state, . . ." an additional franchise tax. N. Y. CONS. LAWs
(Cahill, 1930) c. 61, §184. This tax has been upheld by memorandum decision,
People ex rel New York & Albany Litherage Co. v. Lynch, 229 App. Div. 823,
242 N. Y. S. 903 (1930), aff'd per curiam 259 N. Y. 638. 182 N. E. 214 (1932),
aff'd per curiam 288 U. S. 590, 53 Sup. Ct. 400, 77 L. ed. 969 (1933) commented
upon (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 738.
'Huffman v. Landes, 177 S. E. 200 (Va., 1934).
2 Musselman v. Moxley, 152 Md. 13, 136 Atl. 48 (1927) ; Jollife v. Hite, 1 Call.
301 (Va., 1789) ; Keyton v. Brawford, 5 Leigh. 48 (Va., 1834) ; cf. Clark v. Car-
penter, 19 N. J. Eq. 328 (1868). A series of more recent Georgia cases consider the
fact situation but hold the words "more or less" to be controlling: Goette v. Sutton,
128 Ga. 179, 57 S. E. 308 (1907) ; White v. Adams, 7 Ga. App. 764, 68 S. E. 271
(1910) ; Georgia etc. Co. v. Buck, 134 Ga. 674, 68 S. E. 514 (1910) ; Milner v.
Tyler, 9 Ga. App. 659, 71 S. E. 1123 (1911).
'Hodges v. Denny, 86 Ala. 226, 5 So. 492 (1888) ; Rathke v. Tyler, 136 Iowa
284, 111 N. W. 435 (1907); Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338 (1876); Paine v.
Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 (1882).
